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Strategic Insights: Nuclear Posture Review: Three Reasons the Army Should Care
February 14, 2018 | Dr. Michael Fitzsimmons
Debate over the Trump administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is now in full
and predictable bloom. While many of its conclusions demonstrate continuity with the Obama
administration’s modernization plans, controversy has centered on two of the review’s
recommendations: to deploy new low-yield weapons on sea-launched ballistic and cruise missiles;
and to signal the potential for nuclear retaliation against an adversary’s non-nuclear strikes on
certain critical targets.1 Critics accuse the new policy of lowering the threshold for nuclear use.2
The policy’s authors and their defenders argue to the contrary that Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal
and strategies have lowered the threshold for nuclear use, and buttressing U.S. deterrence
capabilities is the safest response.3
It may be tempting for Army planners and strategists to reflect only briefly on these debates in
thinking about Army priorities for plans, doctrine, and investments. After all, nuclear posture
belongs to the Air Force and the Navy, right? Not exactly. Regardless of one’s views on the debates
over the current NPR, they are worth the Army’s careful attention. Here are three reasons why.
1. Deterrence increasingly demands conventional-nuclear integration.
One need not subscribe to all of the 2018 NPR’s conclusions to take seriously its assessment
of the evolution of the threat environment since the last NPR in 2010. Modernization of China’s
and Russia’s conventional forces have eroded U.S. advantages in potential regional conflict
scenarios, while the same competitors have simultaneously modernized their nuclear forces.
Russia and China could increasingly see their nuclear capabilities not only as an existential
deterrent, as their declaratory policies emphasize, but as a coercive tool for prevailing in a regional
conventional conflict. Moreover, as recent newspaper headlines make plain, North Korea’s
maturing nuclear capabilities are now decisively reshaping notions of deterrence on the Korean
peninsula.
One implication of these trends is the need for the United States and its allies to think more
holistically about deterrence of limited regional aggression. With potential adversaries
strengthening their own nuclear deterrents, segregation of U.S. planning efforts between nuclear
and conventional capabilities is no longer adequate. The new NPR directs that:
U.S. forces will ensure their ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear military planning
and operations. Combatant Commands and Service components will be organized and
resourced for this mission, and will plan, train, and exercise to integrate U.S. nuclear and
non-nuclear forces and operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and attacks.4

This imperative is not born of a desire to make nuclear warfighting more feasible, per se. But
it is based on the reasonable premise that credible deterrence depends in some measure on visibly

realistic warfighting capabilities. In this way, the NPR points toward the future of planning for the
entire Joint Force and thus demands the Army’s full attention.
2. The Army may need to fight on a nuclear battlefield.
This point follows directly from the previous one. As stated, the goal of improved
conventional-nuclear integration is to buttress deterrence, not to prepare for nuclear warfighting.
However, if the NPR’s premise is correct, that in extreme scenarios adversaries may see a benefit
to limited nuclear use, then the likelihood of a U.S. ground maneuver force having to operate in
the midst of such use is on the rise. This risk is central to Russia’s imputed threats to use tactical
nuclear weapons to stave off conventional defeat or escalation by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Also, in the most dire scenarios of war in Korea, it is easy to imagine a
nuclear attack on U.S. Army forces, either preemptively or as the last resort of a toppling regime.
While these scenarios remain relatively unlikely, their growing risk suggests a need for a
thorough assessment of the Army’s capabilities for operating on a nuclear battlefield, including
for defensive measures, detection and remediation, medical response, and related tactics,
techniques, and procedures.5
3. There may be a future for land-based theater missiles.
The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the United States and the
Soviet Union instituted a bilateral ban on ground-launched missiles with ranges from 500-5,500
kilometers. This treaty brought down the curtain on the Army’s last nuclear missile, the Pershing
II. Thirty years later, the INF Treaty’s future looks very uncertain. The United States has publicly
accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and deploying a new ground-launched cruise
missile in the prohibited range, and Russia has replied with dubious counter-accusations of U.S.
violations.6
The NPR makes clear that U.S. responses to Russia’s violations will remain treaty compliant,
and that its policy goal is for Russia to return to compliance, itself.7 Nevertheless, if Russia does
ultimately abrogate the treaty, officially or otherwise, land-based theater missile forces could again
become a consideration for the U.S. military. The most recent National Defense Authorization
Act directed the Department of Defense to initiate (treaty-compliant) research and development
on an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile.8 In keeping with that directive, senior
serving and former defense officials have advocated further consideration of developing such
capabilities.9 New intermediate-range missiles need not be nuclear-capable, of course, and the
Army could conceivably play a major role in fielding new conventional missiles in this range,
regardless of whether new nuclear forces are pursued.10
Naturally, there are many other reasons for the Army to give the NPR close study, including
the simple fact that nuclear modernization will compete for resources. This may affect not only
Army modernization priorities, but also readiness in the Army and across the joint force. But the
Army should also look beyond the NPR’s implications for program trade-offs, and the three points
highlighted here offer strategic grist for Army leaders’ debate and deliberation.
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